This article is a review of the literature on the subject of how nurses who provide palliative care are affected by ethical issues. Few publications focus directly on the moral experience of palliative care nurses, so the review was expanded to include the moral problems experienced by nurses in the care of the terminally ill patients. The concepts are first defined, and then the moral attitudes of nurses, the threats to their moral integrity, the moral problems that are perceived by (...) nurses, and the emotional consequences of these moral problems are considered in turn. The results show that the moral behaviour of nurses, which is theoretically grounded in commitment to care and to the patient, appears to be shaped by specific processes that lead to engagement or to mental and behavioural disengagement in morally difficult situations. Nurses often appear to fail to recognize the moral dimensions of the problems they experience and also to lack the skills they need to resolve moral problems adequately. Although the findings show that several elements that are beyond the control of nurses, owing to their lack of autonomy and authority, influence their moral experience, intrinsic factors such as feelings of insecurity and powerlessness have a profound effect on nurses’ perceptions and attitudes in the face of moral problems. The moral problems perceived by these nurses are related to end-of-life issues, communication with patients, the suffering of patients, and the appropriateness of the medical treatment. (shrink)

Les monuments de Délos et d’Athènes célébrant le pancratiaste et lutteur Ménodôros fils de Gnaios font l’objet d’une analyse conjointe, qui débute par la restitution de leurs bases et la reconstitution du groupe statuaire que portait le premier d’entre eux ; suit un nouvel établissement du texte des inscriptions (ID 1957 et 2498 à Délos, Agora XVIII, C196 / IG II/III3, 4.1, 599, à Athènes), doublé d’une étude des couronnes composant le palmarès de l’athlète. Les données prosopographiques amènent à dater (...) les deux monuments des années 120‑110 et à les situer à l’intersection des chronologies attique et rhodienne. On examine ensuite leur position dans l’histoire du mouvement agonistique et leur environnement topographique. Ces diverses approches aboutissent à des résultats cohérents sur les plans historique et archéologique. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse à l’évolution non seulement quantitative mais aussi qualitative du phénomène du divorce. Dans le divorce, d’un cas à l’autre, on observe de grandes différences suivant le degré d’accomplissement du travail psychique de deuil des ex-partenaires. Mais son extrême banalisation entraîne aussi un important changement d’état d’esprit général, avec des problèmes nouveaux, voire des mutations d’ordre psycho-culturel concernant la vie de couple. La puissante médiatisation contemporaine contribue à amplifier les transformations en cours, modifiant considérablement non seulement les comportements (...) et les mœurs, mais aussi certaines représentations, y compris dans leurs dimensions inconscientes. On voit poindre, entre autres, la représentation d’un « destin » inéluctable qui condamnerait à l’avance tout projet de vie amoureuse durable. Certaines conséquences cliniques en sont perceptibles dans le choix amoureux des couples actuels, où s’atténue parfois la distinction entre couple projeté à long terme et aventure passagère. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk (...) aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

Expanding the Critical Animal Studies Imagination: Essays in Solidarity and Total Liberation pushes critical animal studies forward and outward by making new connections to movements and ideas that have been little engaged with in publication to the present. This book challenges critical animal studies adherents to expand their efforts of solidarity, mutual aid, and activism. Contributors to this volume extend invitations to those not familiar with critical animal studies to welcome them in with gestures of solidarity towards total liberation. Expanding (...) the Critical Animal Studies Imagination does not shy away from controversial topics but critically engages with them using care and tact. This is not controversy for the sake of being provocative, but not being afraid to target root causes of oppression. This book works toward coalition building to resist the current violence and build peaceful communities. (shrink)

Les figures du rien. Leyenberger. Georges4070.

In this article we attend to recent critiques of psychometric applications of life history theory to variance among humans and develop theory to advance the study of latent LH constructs. We then reanalyze data previously examined by Richardson et al., 2017, https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704916666840 to determine whether previously reported evidence of multidimensionality is robust to the modeling approach employed and the structure of LH indicators is invariant by sex. Findings provide further evidence that a single LH dimension is implausible and that researchers (...) should cease interpreting K-factor scores as empirical proxies for LH speed. In contrast to the original study, we detected a small inverse correlation between mating competition and Super-K that is consistent with a trade-off. Tests of measurement invariance across the sexes revealed evidence of metric invariance, consistent with the theory that K is a proximate cause of its indicators; however, evidence of partial scalar invariance suggests use of scores likely introduces bias when the sexes are compared. We discuss limitations and identify approaches that researchers may use to further evaluate the validity of the K-factor and other applications of LH to human variation. (shrink)

In Cultivating Citizens Dwight Allman and Michael Beaty bring together some of America's leading social and political thinkers to address the question of civic vitality in contemporary American society. The resulting volume is a serious reflection on the history of civil society and a rich and rewarding conversation about the future American civic order.

Les marxismes de Chine sont très peu pris en considération en France. Cet article expose quelques hypothèses expliquant cet état de fait et rappelle l’importance de la référence marxiste en Chine à tous les niveaux, des plus hautes instances de l’État à des intellectuels plus ou moins isolés. L’article suggère également quelques pistes pour une analyse marxiste des réalités chinoises aujourd’hui, multiformes, qui empêchent de dresser un état des lieux schématique de l’évolution contemporaine du pays (Chine « capitaliste » ou (...) « socialiste », etc.). Il suggère, au-delà du présent dossier, de poursuivre des recherches sur ces multiples dimensions. (shrink)

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre l'Univers, l'animal, la machine et la ville? A priori pas grand-chose si l'on prend en considération les différences d'échelle ou encore le fait que l'on cherche à rapprocher deux concepts "naturels", l'Univers et l'animal, à deux types de "constructions" humaines, la machine et la ville. Le propos de cet ouvrage est précisément de démontrer le contraire : des constatations identiques ou analogues peuvent s'appliquer à chacun d'eux. Notre appréhension de ces différentes entités a progressé de (...) façon considérable au cours du temps et notoirement au cours des dernières années. Les quatre termes deviennent de plus en plus complexes en même temps que nos analyses deviennent plus performantes. Chacun d'eux est constitué de structures emboîtées : ils sont en mosaïques, ensembles faits d'éléments distincts qui se juxtaposent, mais qui sont toujours plus que la simple somme de leurs éléments. Ils évoluent au cours du temps, et cette évolution est darwinienne : ils s'adaptent, cherchent l'équilibre, et seules subsistent les structures les plus robustes. Et ce qui est le plus réussi, le plus adapté, est aussi bien souvent ce que nous trouvons le plus beau... Mettre en parallèle les regards d'un astrophysicien, d'un biologiste, d'un architecte et d'un roboticien permet à chacune de ses disciplines d'apporter un éclairage nouveau sur les trois autres : un bel exercice de dialogue. (shrink)

This book, which was completed just before Jean Hampton’s untimely death in April 1996, is an admirable hybrid. Although it successfully achieves its stated purpose of “acquaint[ing] the student of political philosophy both with [its] questions and with the various answers to them proposed by philosophers since the ancient Greeks”, it is, at the same time, quite an original work—one that can be read with real profit by professional philosophers as well as students.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:150. A HUMEAN PATTERN OF JUSTIFICATION Interpretations of Hume have tended to fall into two categories: naturalistic and sceptical. Those which fall into the former category see Hume as letting justification rest upon a system of natural beliefs which can neither be supported nor overthrown by reason. Those in the latter category see Hume's point as being essentially negative, that all attempts at justification either within or without a (...) framework of natural belief are doomed. My aim in this paper is to argue that neither naturalistic nor sceptical interpretations do justice to Hume. Instead closer attention must ' be paid to a general pattern- of justification which Hume uses, a pattern which does not rely on "natural beliefs" and which, obviously, since it is a pattern of justification, is not sceptical. My approach will be to avoid either of these two extremes by concentrating on a pattern of justification which equates justification with rationality. However, in order to do this, it will be necessary, first of all, to provide some account of what Hume means by rationality, especially as concerns its connection with truth. As we shall see, Hume's notion of justification requires that some basis in the truth be provided whenever we believe something to be worthy of acceptance. Second, it will be necessary to introduce the factor of foundations. As I see it, a foundation, for Hume, is a mechanism or some component of a mechanism for the production of belief in epistemic areas or of evaluation in moral and aesthetic areas. The concept of foundation is an explanative, not a justificatory, notion. But, although all references to foundations are made for the purpose of explaining why someone has a certain belief or makes a certain 151 evaluation, some foundations in addition provide a basis for justifying a belief or evaluation. I My main contention is that, for Hume, all justification depends on a judgment's truth. Truth is the sole criterion of justification. Since truth lies at the base of Hume's practice of justification, some account of his views on it must be given. At the outset, it is vitally important to pay attention to the notions of truth and falsehood and the related notions of the truth-values, true and false. As I shall argue, when these terms function as part of Hume's semantic vocabulary, they serve to indicate what sorts of things can have a truth-value in the sense of having specifiable kinds of truth-conditions. On the other hand, when they function primarily as epistemic terms for Hume, they serve to indicate that the truthvalue of some item can be known or established. Consequently, Hume must first distinguish the semantic class of entities that are potential bearers of the truth-values "true" or "false", and then he must distinguish from among the members of this class those which have the epistemic status of having known truth or falsehood, i.e., an ascertained truth-value. Let us, then, first consider Hume's semantics in order to find out what sorts of items he believes have truthvalues and what sorts of truth-conditions these items may have. In an important passage in the Treatise, Hume implicitly draws the distinction between the semantic and epistemic considerations mentioned above: Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of 152. being true or false, and can never he an object of our reason (T458). What sorts of things are incapable of this agreement or disagreement? Hume continues by. giving this reply: Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason (T458). Hume obviously intends a contrast to be drawn between items which are original facts and realities and those which are not.These original... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:98 COMMENTS ON TWEYMAN AND DAVIS Tweyman contends that in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Philo sets aside his Pyrrhonian or skeptical approach to theology, which consists in falsifying or casting doubt on the hypotheses of Cleanthes, and instead argues for a thesis of his own, viz. what we might call the "indifference thesis" that the original source of all things is morally indifferent. Davis counters with (...) an alternative interpretation of these two Parts of the Dialogues, arguing that Philo's approach to Cleanthes' arguments is consistent throughout the Dialogues and that Philo's aim is always the same, viz., to show that if cleanthes remains true to his principles and accepts their logical consequences, it is Cleanthes who is the Pyrrhonian and Philo who is the moderate skeptic. My position is that neither Tweyman nor Davis have given a proper analysis of Parts X and XI. I would agree with Davis that Tweyman' s position does seem to have an initial implausibility to it for at least two reasons. First of all, in Part II Philo commits himself to the "mystical incomprehensibility thesis" that the attributes of God are perfect but incomprehensible; and the mystical incomprehensibility thesis is incompatible with the indifference thesis. It cannot be the case both that God has perfect but incomprehensible attributes and that we also know he is morally indifferent. Moreover, the mystical incomprehensi2 bility thesis is reiterated in Part VI and more importantly, in Part X: "None but we mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible" 99 (D 199). Since Philo appears to stick to the mystical incomprehensibility thesis, Tweyman has a problem explaining how Philo can hold one position on the attributes of God in Part X (the mystical incomprehensibility thesis) and then supposedly reverse himself in Part XI to argue for another (the indifference thesis). Second, Tweyman' s position seems to contradict the strategic position outlined by Philo in Part II: "You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion." (D 145) The strategy is to show Cleanthes that any position but that of the mystics has dangerous, i.e., skeptical or theologically unwelcome consequences, and so should be abandoned. Philo's strategy is not to defend his own position, but rather to reveal the weaknesses in Cleanthes' position. Thus far I would agree that Davis' interpretation is more consistent with both Philo's strategic position and with his mystical incomprehensibility thesis. Yet Davis does not directly take up the important point about Parts X and XI which Tweyman raises: that Philo changes his way of arguing in Parts X and XI from that which he had been employing previously in the first eight sections, i.e., that he changes from a Pyrrhonian to a non-Pyrrhonian way of arguing. This is how Tweyman puts it: In the first eight sections, Philo argues against Cleanthes' hypothesis by advancing his own hypotheses. His effort to advance hypotheses must be assessed in light of the fact that (by his own admission) all such hypotheses are based on insufficient 100 data, and, therefore, none is, strictly speaking, acceptable. Their use is not to establish truths about the nature of God, but to establish the conclusion which we find at the end of Part VIII that 'a total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' The design of the world is compatible with, and could have arisen from, an indefinite number of designing principles. On the other hand, we have seen that in dealing with Cleanthes' hypotheses in Parts X and XI we are able to proceed more scientifically, and, in this manner, eliminate all but one of the hypotheses which can be introduced to explain the design of the world. (Tweyman 84-85) Now Tweyman does seem to have a point here. It is true that Philo takes his arguments in Parts X and XI to have a conclusiveness which he did not attribute to his... (shrink)

When philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary ethical, environmental, economic, legal, and social analysis of nanotechnologies, what is their specific contribution? At first glance, the contribution of philosophy appears to be a clarification of the various moral and ethical arguments that are commonly presented in philosophical discussion. But if this is the only contribution of philosophy, then it can offer no more than a stalemate position, in which each moral and ethical argument nullifies all the others. To provide an alternative, we (...) must analyze the reasons behind the prevailing individual and cultural relativism in ethics. The epistemological investigation of this stalemate position will guide us to the core problem of the relation between theory and action . The stalemate can be overcome from a pragmatic philosophical standpoint, which combines epistemology, philosophy of language—that is, the philosophy of speech acts—and practical reasoning—that is, reasoning about decision-making . From this philosophical standpoint, it will be possible to show how philosophy can accompany and support the development of nanotechnologies. (shrink)

The emergence and development of convergent technologies for the purpose of improving human performance, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information sciences, and cognitive science (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and moral arguments that must be engaged by philosophers who hope to take seriously the question of the ethical and social acceptability of these technologies. This article advances an analysis of the factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the topic, in order to help in understanding why arguments that (...) form a part of the debate between transhumanism and humanism result in a philosophical and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that emerges from the fact that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and the negative evaluation of NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these arguments with foundations that will enable others to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic society. The present effort at communication about the difficulties of the argumentation process is intended as a necessary first step towards developing an interdisciplinary response to those difficulties. (shrink)

Il y a exactement deux siècles, Hegel a proposé, dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit, une reconquête philosophique de la sagesse, c'est-à-dire de l'identification avec soi apaisante de la vie la plus engagée dans un temps dont le bouleversement accéléré semblait l'exclure. Il y est parvenu par une remémoration pensante ordonnant et justifiant, dans la rigueur du concept (phénoméno-logie), l'assomption vraie de tous les moments et aspects essentiels du lien concret, théorique et pratique, naturel et culturel, individuel et communautaire, del'homme au (...) monde à travers lequel l'être, dans la surprise et la contradiction, lui apparaît (phénoméno-logie). C'est ce chemin phénoménologique vers elle-même d'une humanité redressée philosophiquement selon sa propre exigence de réconciliation spirituelle, que Hegel a tracé dans un prodigieux effort spéculatif qui exige assurément beaucoup du lecteur, mais lui apporte aussi beaucoup, encore et toujours, aujourd'hui. (shrink)

Cette statuette, très exactement datée tant par son contexte archéologique que par son style, nous fournit l'inscription en linéaire A la plus récente connue à ce jour (PO Zg 1). Six des huit signes peints qu'elle présente se retrouvent dans le même ordre sur l'épingle en argent de Platanos qui porte une inscription en linéaire A (PL Zf 1). Il est possible qu'il s'agisse d'un nom de divinité suivi de la «formule» A-SA-SA-RA-·. Le document démontre en tout cas la survivance (...) de certains aspects tant de la religion que de l'écriture minoenne jusqu'à une période avancée de l'époque mycénienne. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Gaston Bachelard apparaît aujourd'hui comme une oeuvre prophétique. Dans la mesure où elle concerne aussi bien les domaines de l'imagination et de la poésie que les démarches rationnelles de la recherche scientifique la plus avancée. Et l'homme contemporain est effectivement en proie aux exigences contradictoires de l'intelligence spéculative et des dérives créatrices de l'imaginaire. (4e de couverture).